



The Power of Sharing Information
Chance favors the connected mind.
—Steven Johnson
After spending a day at a conference, I was having dinner with a dozen or so peers when 
a debate began about the dangers and benefits of sharing security information with other 
companies. One person turned to me and asked if I had information about a specific new 
threat, would I share it with him.
“You bet,” I said.
“But what if I was your competitor—would you still share?” he asked.
“Our companies might compete for business,” I replied, “but in the security arena,  
my real competitors are the malicious actors who want to harm my company’s 
information systems. Those are my competitors, and they’re your competitors, too.”
As soon as I’d said this, several people at the table agreed. This agreement was 
gratifying—and not just because I felt that I had support for my views. The bigger 
implication was that my peers saw the value of sharing information outside their 
companies.
This hasn’t always been the case. In fact, many organizations still frown on the idea 
of sharing security information externally, and some have policies that forbid it.
There are two primary reasons why organizations are afraid to share. First, they have 
concerns about the legal implications of revealing security information. A second, related 
concern is the public-relations aspect. Both of these fears have a valid basis. Information 
security has become an enterprise risk management issue of board-level interest 
because of the potential effects. Information leaks revealing potential intrusions and 
data breaches can have legal consequences: the organization may be required to report 
the problems in order to comply with financial and privacy regulations, for example. 
If security issues become public, they may also damage the way the organization 
is perceived by customers and by the business community, potentially affecting a 
company’s profitability and its stock price.
Despite these concerns, I believe that it is becoming increasingly important to 
partner with other organizations to share information about security-related issues such 
as threats and best practices. As I’ll explain in this chapter, sharing security information 
can provide considerable benefits in managing the risk of moving into new business 
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relationships and adopting new technologies. We just need to find ways to reduce the 
risk of sharing. The solution lies in creating trusted information-sharing relationships 
with other organizations. The more we trust the relationship, the more sensitive the 
information that can be shared.
The need to share security information is being driven by rapidly changing business, 
technology, and threat landscapes. Increasingly, companies are collaborating with a 
broad variety of business partners. We share business information, and often we also use 
the same information technology. As we do so, we also share risks. Understanding the 
risks faced by our partners, and the way they manage those risks, can help us protect our 
own organizations.
Looking more broadly across the technology landscape, all systems and devices 
are to some extent connected—whether they are owned by enterprises, individuals, 
or service providers. Almost every aspect of society depends on a worldwide, rapidly 
evolving, highly complex network of devices and services. This provides the central 
nervous system that supports innovation, economic development, and social interaction 
worldwide. But because we are all inherently interconnected, we share common risks. 
The threat landscape is dynamic, global, and increasingly complex. Threats may originate 
in any country and then spread rapidly across national and enterprise boundaries, 
causing extensive damage to organizations and individuals worldwide.
Because threats spread so quickly and the threat landscape is so complex, it is hard 
for any single organization to gain a clear view of all potential vulnerabilities, threats, 
and attacks. External partnerships can help. They provide additional intelligence that 
we can use to improve our own security posture. By exchanging information with other 
organizations, we gain what I call outsight, or a better understanding of what happens 
outside our own environment. We learn about new threats before they hit us directly. We 
see how other organizations are managing those threats. We learn about best practices 
for managing security operations. Using the information we gather from external 
relationships, we can increase the organization’s ability to sense, interpret, and act  
on risk.
The Value of External Partnerships
Sharing security-related information can require initiative and courage. The idea of 
sharing information externally may run counter to the culture of the organization 
overall, including the culture within the security group. Organizations may view security 
information as proprietary and confidential, like intellectual property. Many still have 
policies against sharing information.
It’s true that much security information is sensitive, and sharing it can introduce 
risks. Because of this, we need to be careful about what we share and with whom.
But think about the broader context of how organizations are increasingly sharing 
information. Most organizations have already recognized they need to share sensitive 
business information with partners in order to develop, manufacture, and market new 
products. Collaboration with other companies is becoming an integral part of many 
other business processes, too. As organizations share information, they benefit from 
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their partners’ insights and expertise. As noted by Steven Johnson, author of Where Good 
Ideas Come From: The Natural History of Innovation (Riverhead Books, 2010), many of 
the best ideas have emerged not through the inspiration of a single mind, but through 
the exchange of ideas. “You have half of an idea, somebody else has the other half, and 
if you’re in the right environment, they turn into something larger than the sum of their 
parts,” Johnson said in a speech at the 2010 TEDGlobal conference (Johnson 2010). “We 
often talk about the value of protecting intellectual property—building barricades, having 
secretive R&D labs, patenting everything that we have, so that those ideas will remain 
valuable . . . but I think there’s a case to be made that we should spend at least as much 
time, if not more, valuing the premise of connecting ideas and not just protecting them.”
I believe that there’s similar value in sharing security information. As we collaborate 
with business partners, we need to understand the threats to their environment, and 
how they manage risk, in order to determine what we need to do to protect our own 
organizations. Each partner in a value chain needs to protect information to a level 
that is adequate to protect the other partners; the weakest link in the chain can impact 
everyone. Note that throughout this chapter, I use the terms “partner” and “partnership” 
in the colloquial sense, not to imply any specific type of formal legal relationship.
There are many other examples of how sharing information can benefit all 
organizations involved. If we are entering new markets through business partnerships, 
we need to understand the nature of the threats in those markets from the companies 
currently operating there. The same logic applies to using new technologies. Organizations 
are extending their environment to customers and becoming suppliers of mobile apps 
and web services in the process. As they do, they can learn from other companies’ 
experience how to manage the risks. Companies are increasingly sharing cloud capacity 
or other data-center infrastructure supplied by external providers, and can all benefit by 
sharing feedback with the provider about risks within the environment.
Despite these trends, some organizations still have policies stipulating that employees 
shouldn’t share internal information about risks and threats with anyone outside the 
company. This is sometimes the case even when the same organization willingly shares 
other IT-related information such as helpdesk or e-mail management best practices.
Without wishing to discount the real fears driving these policies, the value of sharing 
information often outweighs the risk of doing so. Let’s imagine that a CISO learns of a 
new threat affecting companies in his industry sector. He shares information about the 
threat with a peer at another company and, by doing so, gains insight that helps the 
organization mitigate an attack that has caused massive damage at other companies. By 
sharing information against company policy, the CISO took a personal risk. Yet by doing 
so, he averted the bigger risk of business disruption and damage to the organization’s 
reputation.
Failure to share information with others introduces its own risks. If we don’t share 
with peers, they won’t share with us, so we won’t benefit from their information and insights. 
I’ve seen cases in which information security professionals wanted to participate in 
communities, but weren’t allowed by their companies to share any internal security-
related information. So they attended meetings but couldn’t contribute. Ultimately, their 
peers wouldn’t tolerate a situation in which these people were receiving information but 
giving nothing in return, and they were effectively voted off the island.
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External Partnerships: Types and Tiers
Much of the publicity about information-sharing initiatives has focused on public-private 
partnerships related to critical infrastructure and national security. However, there are 
many other types of formal and informal external information-sharing relationships, 
including 1:1 partnerships and groups comprised solely of private-sector organizations.
External partnerships are most often used to share information about specific threats 
and best security practices. But some partnerships focus on other types of information. 
For example, security specialists within the high-tech sector share information in order to 
develop security standards, which are then implemented in various products.
Much of this security information is sensitive. Because of this, we need to be able to 
trust that the partners with whom we share information will treat it appropriately. The 
more sensitive the information, the greater the level of trust required. In general, the 
level of trust can be higher in relationships with fewer people, allowing more-sensitive 
information to be shared. As the number of people increases, there’s a greater chance 
that information will leak, so the level of trust tends to decrease and only less-sensitive 
information is shared.
Relationships therefore naturally tend to fall into a tiered pyramid model, as shown 
in Figure 4-1 and described further in Table 4-1 (Willis 2012). At the top of the pyramid 
are the most-trusted relationships with the fewest partners—1:1 partnerships between 





Increasing number of partners 
or participants
Increasing level of trust and 
sensitivity of shared 
information
Figure 4-1. Tiered pyramid model for trusted information-sharing partnerships and 
communities (Adapted from Willis 2012). Source: Intel Corporation, 2012
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Information-sharing relationships between more than two partners are often 
referred to as communities. Because more people are involved, a legal or peer-enforced 
agreement is usually needed to define the level of trust and confidentiality expected 
among community members.
The two middle tiers of the pyramid include groups with intermediate levels of trust, 
sharing information with varying levels of sensitivity. The Targeted tier typically consists 
of public-private partnerships aimed at protecting critical infrastructure. The Confidential 
tier includes many private-sector communities, including regional communities and 
those focused on specific industry sectors.
At the bottom of the pyramid is the Public tier, comprised of the largest communities 
with the lowest level of trust. At this level, information is often public and may be 
broadcast via the Internet. This tier might include groups that develop educational 
information about threats for public distribution, or CISOs who share their insights via 
public webcasts.
How can you get involved in information-sharing partnerships? One good method 
is to start by participating in communities in the Public tier, where the information 
shared has a relatively low level of sensitivity and therefore involves little risk. In these 
communities, you’re likely to meet peers with whom you can begin to engage in 1:1 
partnerships. As you become more knowledgeable about the communities that reflect 
your organization’s key interests, you may then become involved in communities in the 
middle tiers of the pyramid, where more confidential information is exchanged. At Intel’s 
Information Risk and Security group, we participate in partnerships in all the tiers of the 
pyramid.
1:1 Partnerships
In my experience, 1:1 partnerships are some of the most valuable security relationships. 
They may be formal or informal, established at a corporate level or between individuals.
As I explained, a key advantage of a trusted 1:1 partnership is that we can more safely 
share highly confidential information. We can often create a stronger bond with a single 
individual than with a larger group. As a result, the shared information often has a depth 
and richness that’s lacking in information shared within larger communities.
Another advantage is speed. Communication is often fastest in 1:1 partnerships, 
partly due to logistics. It’s much easier to set up a meeting between two people than it 
is to organize a meeting with a dozen people. To exchange information about the latest 
developments, a CISO may be able to simply pick up the phone and have a conversation 
with his or her peer. Quickly sharing information enables a faster response to  
threats—and in the security arena, timeliness is often critical.
Here’s an example showing how 1:1 partnerships can develop and benefit both 
partners. Through my participation in a larger security community, I got to know 
the CISO at a fast-growing e-commerce company whose customers were primarily 
consumers. We both would contact each other periodically for advice and information 
as we puzzled over the latest security challenges. Over time, these conversations evolved 
into open dialogues about best practices and benchmarking.
The relationship eventually evolved to a point where we both realized we could learn 
a great deal more by bringing our teams together in a face-to-face meeting. The resulting 
half-day meeting proved incredibly valuable to both teams. Our team was able to 
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provide insights and experiences about managing security in a large, complex enterprise 
environment. This was helpful to the security team at the fast-growing e-commerce 
company, which was in the process of building an enterprise environment to support 
its fast-growing business. In return, the team at the e-commerce company was able to 
share the security challenges and experiences of operating a large consumer business 
with millions of online customers. This was extremely valuable to us at Intel, because we 
were in the process of expanding our external online presence and were beginning to 
encounter some of the same challenges.
The partnership thus expanded from ad hoc conversations to a productive 
relationship between teams sharing experiences and best practices at multiple levels. It’s 
hard to imagine that this extensive information exchange could have occurred within a 
larger community.
Another example: I met the CISO of a large manufacturing company at an industry 
event, and we stayed in touch through occasional e-mails. Then, during a period of 
especially large-scale industry attacks, our communications suddenly became much 
more frequent and detailed. It was extremely valuable to be able to pick up the phone and 
simply call a peer to share the latest knowledge about the attacks and responses.
As Intel’s CISO, I have frequent 1:1 meetings with peers at other companies, 
sometimes as often as several times a week. These meetings can serve several purposes. 
Recently, I met with a team from a key supplier to discuss our strategy for securing 
employees’ personal (bring-your-own) devices. I shared our best practices with this 
team, and during the question-and-answer discussion, team members also provided 
information about how they were addressing the same problem. The meeting served as a 
helpful benchmarking exercise for all of us.
At the same time, the discussion clearly demonstrated each company’s commitment 
to protecting its partner’s business information. It showed the depth of each company’s 
strategy for protecting information—revealing a commitment that extended far beyond 
the desire to comply with contract confidentiality clauses. I felt more confident that if a 
security issue ever arose, I could talk directly to my counterparts at the supplier company 
because their commitment to protecting information would enable a productive 
approach to resolving problems.
Communities
Participating in larger communities may not provide information that’s quite as rich and 
deep as the information you’d obtain from a 1:1 partnership with a peer. But communities 
provide value in other ways.
Because they contain more people, communities provide breadth and diversity 
of perspective that help us make balanced risk decisions. With a larger number of 
participants, there’s a better chance that one of them will have developed a solution to a 
problem, or provide valuable new information about an industry attack.
Some communities focus on sharing threat-related information; others on 
benchmarking and best practices, influencing legislation, developing security standards, 
or public education.
Communities can also present great networking opportunities. Through 
participation in communities, I’ve met several people with whom I’ve subsequently 
developed closer 1:1 partnerships.
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Community Characteristics
Like all groups, communities require a structure and set of ground rules to be effective. 
Successful communities typically have the following characteristics:
•	 Clear goals. The community shares clearly defined common goals 
that benefit members, such as mitigating an industry-wide threat. 
A community may have several goals.
•	 A strong framework of trust, such as a legal or peer-enforced 
agreement, that addresses risks related to information sharing 
among community members. For example, the Industry 
Consortium for the Advancement of Security on the Internet 
(ICASI) has a strong multilateral nondisclosure agreement, while 
other communities, such as the Bay Area CSO Council, rely on a 
peer-enforced trust framework.
•	 Trusted communications channels. Members can safely contribute 
and access shared information using an effective trusted 
communications channel or mechanism, such as a secure web 
site. These channels are not always electronic; some regional 
groups conduct face-to-face meetings to further reduce the risk of 
compromise.
An organization is most likely to benefit from joining communities if those 
communities align with the organization’s security goals. This means it’s important to 
first clearly define those organizational security goals. To do this, some organizations 
have found it helpful to use a structured approach—they can more clearly categorize 
their goals by mapping them to a standard risk management model, such as the “defense 
in depth” model. Once an organization clearly understands its own security goals, it can 
identify communities whose objectives align with these goals.
Because there is such a diverse range of organizations, security threats, and goals, it 
is unlikely that any single information-sharing community structure meets all the needs 
of a large organization. For example, a company might participate in one community for 
benchmarking and another to tackle industry-specific threats.
Information-sharing communities thrive only when the participating organizations 
feel they’re receiving valuable information, creating incentives to continue to share 
information with others.
What constitutes valuable information? A common definition is that information 
should be timely and specific, relevant to participants’ concerns, and providing a suitable 
level of detail while protecting individual privacy (ENISA 2010). In practice, “valuable” 
usually means the information helps you achieve your security goals, whether those 
goals are long-term and strategic, or short-term and operational. Information useful 
for strategic goals might include an early warning that attackers are expected to target a 
specific industry. This helps members of the community plan their defenses. Information 
useful for operational goals typically includes more specific details, such as an attack 
signature. This helps organizations more quickly identify an attack and respond when  
it occurs.
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As shown in Figure 4-1 and Table 4-1 (the Targeted tier), some communities 
consist of government agencies working alongside industry in what are usually known 
as public-private partnerships (PPPs). These PPPs can be particularly important for 
protecting critical information infrastructure. Internationally and within many nations, 
this infrastructure is largely owned and operated by the private sector, including carriers 
and network service providers. Sharing information about threats and attacks among 
public and private agencies therefore can help ensure security and resiliency of this 
infrastructure. Because the shared information is highly sensitive, these PPPs usually 
have strong trust frameworks including national security clearances.
Other communities primarily include private-sector organizations. Members of an 
industry may get together to share best practices, helping to reduce risk for each company 
while enhancing the industry’s reputation overall.
Some communities are regional, aimed at security professionals from private and 
public-sector organizations located within a specific area. These regional communities 
offer the advantage of convenience. It takes less time, effort, and expense to attend a 
regional event, which makes participation more attractive.
Examples of regional groups and forums include the San Francisco Bay Area CSO 
Council, described shortly. Other useful regional events include the CISO Executive 
Summits organized by Evanta. These are invitation-only gatherings at which CISOs 
and other industry experts share insights and information about a wide range of areas, 
including legal, policy, and security issues.
New communities arise frequently. A community may form in response to a specific 
threat because companies are strongly motivated to share information about the threat in 
order to develop effective defenses. For example, the Conficker Work Group was formed 
specifically to address the risk posed by the Conficker worm.
Community Goals
Communities may focus on narrowly defined goals, such as mitigating a specific threat, 
or they may have broader information-sharing goals, such as benchmarking security 
techniques. A single community may pursue several goals. The most well-known types 
of goal are sharing information about threats (to help member organizations mitigate 
those threats) and sharing best practices (to improve efficiency). I’ll describe the main 
categories of information-sharing goals next.
Sharing Information About Threats and Vulnerabilities
Perhaps the best-known function of communities is to provide a trusted mechanism for 
sharing information about threats and vulnerabilities. Members of the community can 
use this information to improve their tactical and strategic situational awareness.
I’m often asked by peers how I measure the value of the information obtained 
from external partnerships. A key metric is whether the early threat information has 
helped enable us to reduce risk. A single piece of information might make participation 
worthwhile if it helps us better mitigate risk and protect the company.
Information from the community can also be useful for corroborating evidence 
that we’ve already identified internally. If we observe a potential new threat within our 
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environment, we may not feel that we have enough evidence to justify taking action. But 
we can often discuss the issue within a community. If others are experiencing the same 
problem, we can be more confident that it’s a real issue. This gives us enough reason to act.
Some examples of communities that share threat information include:
•	 Bay Area CSO Council. This is a regional community that focuses 
on improving the sharing of intelligence and best practices 
among CISOs in the San Francisco Bay Area. The Council 
serves as a vehicle for CISOs to safely and securely share their 
attack experiences. Members may share artifacts, such as attack 
signatures, that they can then build into their organizations’ 
detection and defense mechanisms (Jackson Higgins 2010). The 
forum uses a peer-enforced trust model rather than a formal legal 
framework. The group also creates subgroups to work on more 
highly classified information.
•	 Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs). ISACs are 
trusted industry-specific communities established by owners 
and operators of critical infrastructure resources. ISACs exist 
for a number of industry sectors, including communications, 
electrical utility, health, and public transit. Services provided 
by ISACs include risk mitigation, incident response, and alert 
and information sharing. Intel is a member of the IT sector ISAC 
(IT-ISAC), which focuses on sharing cyber situational awareness 
information between IT industry members in the United States. 
The IT-ISAC has a legal framework of trust characterized by a 
memorandum of understanding among members.
Sharing Best Practices and Benchmarking
Many communities also serve as a forum for exchanging best practices and for 
benchmarking operations. By sharing security best practices, we may be able to increase 
the efficiency and effectiveness of our own operations.
Tapping into the expertise of others can help us avoid reinventing the wheel. A 
typical example: A CISO is trying to create a bring-your-own device policy for her own 
organization. So she sends a message to community members and receives detailed 
advice from others who have already been through the process. This gives the CISO a 
head start in creating a policy that meets her organization’s needs.
Besides enabling informal exchanges, communities may also operate formal 
benchmarking exercises. One of the best-known examples is the Information Risk 
Executive Council, which conducts studies and generates reports that compare 
companies in a variety of areas, from user security awareness to controls maturity 
(Corporate Executive Board 2012). Benchmarking information generated by communities 
can also be useful for demonstrating the efficiency of security operations to other internal 
groups within your organization, such as an audit committee.
Some benchmarking information is sensitive and closely held because organizations 
feel that it could reveal too much information about their security operations. Other 
information is more general and is sometimes publicly available, such as the webinars 
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and presentations published online by Intel and others. Even this general benchmarking 
information may yield risk insights. Observing what other companies are focusing on, 
and how they are allocating resources, can help security professionals think about how 
they need to manage risk within their own organizations.
One of the most established communities is the Forum for Incident Response and 
Security Teams (FIRST). This international group focuses on sharing best practices 
among computer security incident response teams. Trust relationships are peer-enforced. 
The group publishes a series of detailed best-practices guides and other documents for 
public use. Other activities involve the exchange of information for cooperative incident 
management.
BeNChMarKING: WhO ShOULD YOU COMpare 
YOUrSeLF WIth? 
Many years ago, i was asked to manage intel’s first major it benchmarking activity. 
it was a big task that entailed analyzing cost, quality, and other aspects of operations 
across our entire it environment.
One of the first challenges was determining which organizations we should 
benchmark ourselves against. at the time, the conventional wisdom at most 
organizations, including intel, was that you should compare yourself with similar 
businesses. the logic was that because these businesses were the most directly 
comparable, this approach would yield the most meaningful results. so the 
expectation was that i’d benchmark our operations against a collection of other big 
high-tech companies.
But i didn’t want to benchmark our operations against only high-tech companies. 
instead, i wanted to benchmark against a broad base of companies in industries 
such as retail, banking, manufacturing, consumer goods, and utilities.
the time came to present my selection of peer groups in a meeting with senior it 
management. By this time, i’d already started the benchmarking process, and as i 
described the diversity of the companies included in the benchmark comparison, i 
could sense the atmosphere becoming increasingly hostile. practically everyone felt 
that my approach was completely wrong. in fact, if there had been rotten tomatoes 
in the room, a few people would have been throwing them at me.
so i asked for a moment of quiet so that i could explain. “if we were an airline that 
wanted to benchmark operations, who would we compare ourselves with?” i asked. 
several people said they’d benchmark against other airlines.
“What do you think we would learn from that comparison?” i continued. “My guess 
is not much. We’d all have grown up in the same industry, and we’d probably have 
similar business processes. Many of our employees would have worked for the other 
companies and vice versa, so they’d probably implement similar practices. We might 
learn about minor efficiency improvements, but i wouldn’t expect any breakthroughs.
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“if i really wanted to dramatically improve the way i manage airline gate operations, 
i’d benchmark against a Formula 1 pit crew. those crews can service a car and get 
it back on the road in 20 seconds or less. i’d think about what we could learn from 
studying their processes, their technologies, and their ability to communicate and 
organize, and i’d try to figure out which aspects could cross over into airline data 
operations. if we want to make dramatic improvements, we need to look at people 
who operate in an extreme operational environment—not at other airlines.”
i’m happy to say that the managers in the room recognized that there might be 
value in the approach i was suggesting, even if many of them still disagreed with 
it. Ultimately, benchmarking against companies in a broad range of industries did 
help us achieve some dramatic improvements, and i received an internal award for 
the initiative. the lesson is that sometimes we can learn more by looking outside a 
narrowly defined, traditional peer group. people in the same industry may be facing 
the same problems as we are and dealing with them the same way. For a fresh 
perspective, it can be worth looking farther afield.
Influencing Regulations and Standards
All of us operate within an increasingly complex regulatory environment, and we’re all 
affected by evolving technology standards.
It’s important to stay abreast of legislative developments. That can be a difficult and 
time-consuming job for any single organization, and so it may be helpful to become 
involved in a community whose goals include tracking regulatory activity.
In addition, communities can sometimes help influence public policy more 
effectively than a single organization can do alone. There’s strength in numbers, and 
communities often include some of the biggest companies in an industry.
An example of a community that focuses on policy is BITS (www.bits.org), the 
technology policy division of The Financial Services Roundtable, which represents 100 
of the largest integrated providers of consumer financial services. Members of BITS 
cooperate on issues such as critical infrastructure protection, fraud prevention, and 
the safety of financial services. The organization works to influence public policy by 
communicating with public agencies. It also publishes reports for use across the industry, 
including a financial services security assessment. Thus, communities that focus on 
policy may help all participating companies and the reputation of the industry overall.
Businesses who offer services in multiple countries have a particular interest in the 
international regulatory environment. These include multinationals, of course, which are 
directly affected by the complex web of regulations at international, national, and local levels.
However, these regulations affect a surprisingly large number of other companies, 
too—including many that don’t have employees or facilities physically located in other 
countries. Today, almost any business with a web-based service consumed in multiple 
countries is effectively operating in a multinational environment. Regulations in  
those countries have impacts that stretch beyond geographical boundaries. For example, 
regional and local regulations such as the California data breach bill (SB1386) and 
European privacy guidelines require compliance by any company that stores information 
about residents of those areas, no matter where the company is located.
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Corporate Citizenship
At many companies, including Intel, a large number of employees volunteer in ways that 
benefit their neighborhood or a wide variety of worthy causes. Businesses often provide 
support to help employees do this. There’s a growing trend to leverage the organization’s 
talent and expertise in volunteer corporate citizenship initiatives that are more closely 
related to the organization’s goals and employees’ technical expertise. Examples might 
include offering expert security advice to nonprofits or helping security initiatives in 
other countries.
Security-related corporate citizenship initiatives include the National Cyber Security 
Alliance, whose mission is to educate and empower society to use the Internet safely 
and securely (see staysafeonline.org). The sponsors of the alliance include large high-
tech companies such as Intel. Senior managers at those companies also are among the 
directors of the organization.
Conclusion
The knowledge we acquire via external partnerships can help us protect our own 
organizations. The security landscape has become increasingly complex and dynamic, 
and it’s difficult to track and manage the risks without help from others. Sharing security 
information is also becoming more important as organizations increasingly collaborate 
with business partners and adopt new technologies. Understanding the risks faced 
by our partners, and the way they manage those risks, can help us protect our own 
organizations. As businesses move into new markets and use technology in new ways, we 
need to understand our biggest exposures and how to allocate resources most effectively 
to minimize business risk. Therefore, sharing information can help businesses remain 
competitive and successful.
Organizations have often been reluctant to share security information, but if we 
want help from other people, we have to be prepared to share information ourselves. By 
carefully using trusted partnerships that align with our security goals, we can increase the 
organization’s ability to sense, interpret, and act on risk.
